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INTRODUCTION
T HE Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act2 (JOBS Act) was-at leastapparently-driven by the desire to promote job creation by facilitating
small business capital formation.' The legislation was premised on the correct
assumptions that small businesses create jobs and that an efficient access to
capital is essential for small businesses to emerge, compete, and survive in our
competitive, market economy.'
Titles II,s II, 6 and IV' of the JOBS Act are seemingly aimed at small
businesses' and the special challenges faced by small businesses when they
1 Spears-Gilbert Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law. The author
thanks Rebecca McKinney and William Middleton for their assistance in the preparation of this
Article.
2 Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 1z2-1o6, 126 Stat. 306 (2012)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of r5 U.S.C.).
3 1d.
4 See Rutheford B Campbell, Jr., Regulation A. Small Businesses' Search for WA Moderate
Capital", 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 77, 84-88 (20o6) [hereinafter Campbell,A Moderate Capital| (offering
quantitative and qualitative estimates of the significance of small businesses to our national
economy).
5 JOBS Act, tit. 11, 126 Stat. at 313-15.
6 Id. tit. 111, 126 Stat. at 315-23.
7 Id. tit. IV, 126 Stat. at 323-25.
8 While one may find disagreement regarding a precise definition of small businesses,
data collected annually by the Small Business Administration (SBA) provides sensible categories
regarding business size.The smallest SBA category includes businesses with less than 20 employees.
Earlier, the SBA also provided information regarding businesses with less than ioo employees.
Presently, however, SBA reports do not include information regarding that category but, instead,
report on businesses with less than 50o employees. See, e.g., Campbell, A Moderate Capital, supra
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attempt to access external capital. Title II, entitled Access to Capital for Job
Creators, provides a statutory basis for general solicitations for investors in
Rule 506 offerings. ' Title III, entitled Crowdfunding, provides a statutory
basis for unregistered public offerings of up to one million dollars over the
Internet. 0 Tide IV, entitled Small Company Capital Formation,n requires the
Securities and Exchange Commission to enact a new regulatory exemption
under Section 3(b) of the Securities Act of 1933 (the 1933 Act) for offerings up
to fifty million dollars, subject to such terms "as the Commission may determine
necessary in the public interest and for the protection of investors."1 2 Because
this new Section 3(b)(2) is intended to provide a basis for increasing the amount
that may be offered under the exemption provided by Regulation A, 3 the
Commission's regulations under this statute are sometimes popularly referred
to as "Regulation A-Plus."14
None of the three tides of the JOBS Act is self-executing. Instead, each
tide delegates to the Commission the responsibility to enact implementing
regulations. Thus, whether the JOBS Act achieves its goal of facilitating a
balanced and efficient access to external capital for small businesses depends
both on the Act itself and the Commission's regulatory implementation of the
legislation.
The efficiency of the JOBS Act and the Commission's regulatory
implementations of the JOBS Act can be appropriately measured by reference
to the legislative mandate in Section 2(b) of the 1933 Act."s That section
obligates the Commission, when enacting regulations "in the public interest," to
balance investor protection with capital formation." Such regulatory balance is
essential for a market economy. Businesses must have access to external capital,
but investors may face market failures (inadequate investment information,
disinformation, etc.) that make it impossible in some cases to allocate their
capital to its highest and best use. In such situations, investors-and indeed our
market economy-are unprotected. Investors may, in the worst cases, lose their
entire investment, and our market economy may lose an allocation of capital
note 4, at 85.'The importance of small businesses to our economy is vividly shown through the SBA
data regarding the smallest category (businesses with less than 20 employees). See id. at 84-86.
9 Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-io6, § 20, 126 Stat. 306,
313-15 (20U2).
so Id. §§ 301-305.
i1 Id. §§ 401-402.
12 Id. § 40i(b)(2).
13 Regulation A, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-.263 (2014).
14 Luis A. Aguilar, Comm'r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Remarks at SEC Open Meeting
(Dec. 18, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/37o5405149zo.
15 Securities Act of1933 § 2(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2012).
16 "Whenever ... the Commission is engaged in rulemaking and is required to consider .
whether an action is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, the Commission shall also
consider, in addition to the protection of investors, whether the action will promote efficiency,
competition, and capital formation."Id
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to its most productive use. In such cases, notions of fairness and economic
efficiency necessitate regulation.
It is certain that the JOBS Act will have an effect on businesses' access to
external capital. With regard, however, to the capital formation efforts of small
businesses-businesses that may account for more than 25% of our national
economy" 7-the analysis offered by this Article suggests that the benefits may
be modest. Unless the Commission acts under its delegated authority in a
rational and in some instances bold manner, the benefits from the JOBS Act
to small businesses and their capital formation needs and efforts will be far less
then was possible or anticipated.
I. RULES AND REALITY OF CAPITAL FORMATION
AT THE TIME THE JOBS ACT BECAME LAw
To understand the difficulties that small businesses had in accessing external
capital prior to the JOBS Act, it is helpful first to consider the structural and
economic disadvantages that small businesses inevitably face in the capital
markets. The disadvantages are largely due to high relative transaction costs
that small businesses encounter when they attempt to raise capital and to the
fact that financial intermediation is rarely available for small businesses that are
searching for external capital."
Small businesses typically face very high relative transaction costs when they
attempt to secure external capital."' This is due to the fact that small businesses
usually require only small amounts of external capital. "Relative" transaction
costs are offering expenses relative to the total proceeds from an offering. 20
It is relative, not absolute, transaction costs that impede and in some
cases foreclose access to external capital. To use a simple, extreme example,
legal and accounting expenses of $100,000 are essentially irrelevant in a
$100 million offering (amounting in that case to only 0.1% of the total offering).
But $100,000 in expenses will preclude an offering with total proceeds of
$100,000 (amounting to 100% of the offering in that case).2'
17 Historically, firms with fewer than zo employees have accounted for slightly less than 20%
of all United States employment, and firms with fewer than ioo employees have accounted for
slightly more than 35% of all United States employment. See Campbell, A Moderate Capital, supra
note 4, at 85-
18 Id. at 88-89.
19 Id.
20 If a company spends sio to raise a total of sioo in external capital, the relative offering
costs are io%. Id. at 90.
21 See Rutheford B Campbell, Jr., Blue Sky Laws and the Recent Congressional Preemption
Failure, 22 J. CORP. L. 175, 181 (1997) [hereinafter Campbell, Blue Sky Laws] ("[A]s offerings get
larger, the offerings can stand larger absolute offering costs without collapsing from their own
weight.").
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The small capital requirements of small businesses, therefore, drive up
relative transaction (or offering) costs and make it difficult for small businesses
to raise external capital.22
The other, obviously related structural or economic disadvantage of small
firms trying to find external capital is that financial intermediation is rarely
available to them.23 The problem is that small businesses in search of external
capital are usually unseasoned and, as described above, need relatively small
amounts of capital. Due diligence costs generated by the need for underwriters
or brokers to gather and analyze information regarding unseasoned issuers are
high.24 Small offerings do not generate the proceeds sufficiently large to pay
underwriters or brokers the costs that they encounter in learning and selling the
deal and in assuming the residual risk of liability.25 As a result, small businesses
are generally on their own in selling their securities, and that is a significant
disadvantage.
Consider, for example, Table I below. The information in the table is based
on a sample of 1000 Form Ds filed in connection with Regulation D offerings.
The Table shows that of the 308 Regulation D offerings of less than S1 million
from that sample, only 5.8% of those very small offerings involved financial
intermediation. 26
TABLE I
Regulation D Offerings of Regulation D Offerings of
$1 Million or Less $1 Million to $5 Million
with Financial Intermediation with Financial Intermediation
Percentage 5.8% 12.7%
Number 18/308 31/244
Before the JOBS Act was passed and signed into law, these structural and
economic disadvantages that small businesses encountered in capital formation
were significantly exacerbated by two related legal obstacles. The two legal
impediments were the result of the combined effects of state and federal
statutes and regulations requiring the registration of securities.
The first legal problem faced by small businesses was that the combined state
and federal registration regimes effectively foreclosed any broad solicitation for
22 Campbell, A Moderate Capital, supra note 4, at 81.
23 Id. at 88.
24 Id. at 89.
25 See id.
26 A sample of iooo Regulation D filings was obtained from SEC filings during the period
from September 15, 2010, to October 12, zobo. This data was first reported in Rutheford B Campbell,
Jr., 7he Wreck of Regulation D: 7he Unintended (and Bad) Outcomes for the SEC's Crown Jewel
Exemptions, 66 Bus. LAW. 919, 931 tbl.IX (2oi) [hereinafter Campbell, The Wreck ofRegulation D].
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external capital.27 A second, related legal problem was that the capital raising
efforts of small businesses were subject to multiple, separate state and federal
regulatory regimes requiring the registration of securities that were offered and
sold in connection with capital raising efforts.28
Regarding the legal impediments to a broad solicitation of capital by
small businesses, consider the fact that before the JOBS Act, there were four
broadly available federal exemptions from the registration obligations imposed
by the 1933 Act.29 They were: Section 4(a)(2) of the 1933 Act, 0 as that
statute was interpreted by the courtS31 and the Commission; Regulation D;3 2
Regulation A;3 and the intrastate exemption as provided by Rule 147. Issuers
offering under any of these exemptions were legally foreclosed from any broad
solicitation for capital.3 1
The exemption provided by Section 4(a)(2) was limited to "transactions by
an issuer not involving any public offering."3  Predicating that exemption from
registration on the absence of any "public offering" foreclosed an issuer's broad
solicitation for external capital.
With regard to Regulation D, all three of its exemptions-Rule 504,
Rule 505 and Rule 506-were conditioned on the absence of any "general
solicitation or general advertising."38  This requirement prohibited any broad
solicitation for investors.
27 Campbell, A Moderate Capital, supra note 4, at 91-92; Rutheford B Campbell, Jr.,
Regulation A and theJOBSAct.A Failure to Resuscitate,7 OHIO Sr. ENTREPRENEURIAL Bus. LJ.317,
322-23 (2012) [hereinafter Campbell, Failure to Resuscitate].
28 Campbell,A Moderate Capital, supra note 4, at 91.
29 Section 4(a)(6)-now renumbered as section 4 (a)5)-is a fifth exemption from
registration for offerings to "accredited" investors. Securities Act of 1933 § 4(a)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)
(5) (2012). Section 4(a)(6) had a modest usage, principally because Regulation D offered issuers a
more attractive alternative. Indeed, from the period between January i, 2005, and October 16, 2012,
only 3288 of ro7,o18 (3.1%) exempt offerings reported on Form D were offered under what is now
section 4(a)(5). See Disclosure and Transactions, KNOWLEDGE MOSAIC, www.knowledgemosaic.com
(last visited Apr. 1, 2012) (follow "Exempt Offerings"hyperlink; then search "Securities Act Section
4(a)(6)" (KNOWLEDGE MOSAIc has yet to update their search criteria to the renumbered section)).
30 Securities Act of 1933 § 4(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 7 7d(a)(2).
31 In its broadest sense, the limit on the breadth of the issuer's solicitation in a section 4(a)(2)
offering was set by the Supreme Court in SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 1z (1953), when the
Court limited offerings to persons who can "fend for themselves."Id. at 124-25.
32 Regulation D, 17 C.ER. §§ 230.500-.508 (2014).
33 Regulation A, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-.263 (2014) (enacted by the Securities and Exchange
Commission under the authority of section 3(b) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77 c(b)
(2012)).
34 Rule 147,17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (2014).
35 See Campbell, The Wreck ofRegulation D, supra note 26, at 933-935-
36 Securities Act of 1933 § 4(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(2) (2012).
37 See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124-26 (1953)-
38 17 C.ER. § 230.502(c). All three rules, Rule 504, 17 C.F.R. § 230.504, Rule 505, 17 C.ER.
§ 23.505, and Rule 506, 17 C.F.R. § 230-506, conditioned exemptions from registration on the
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Although the federal exemptions from registration provided by
Regulation A and Rule 14711 were not dependent on the absence of any
"public offering" or "general solicitation,"" state regulatory regimes effectively
throttled any broad search for external capital by small businesses relying on
those federal exemptions. Significant in that regard was the fact that National
Securities Markets Improvement Act 41 (NSMIA) enacted by Congress in
1996 failed to preempt state registration authority over offerings made under
Regulation A4' or Rule 147.43 As a result, offerings under those exemptions
were subject to state regulatory regimes. Typically, issuers attempting to
coordinate a state exemption with offerings exempt under Regulation A or
Rule 147 were forced to rely on a state's small offering exemption or, in more
recent times, on a state's accredited investor exemption." Both of those state
exemptions from registration prohibited a broad solicitation for capital. States'
absence of any general solicitation or advertising based on general conditions found in 7 C.F.R.
§ 230.502(c).
39 Regulation A, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-.263 (2014); Rule 147, 17 C.F.R. § 230.147
40 In fact, the Securities and Exchange Commission's rules regarding a valid Regulation
A or Rule 147 offering facilitate a general solicitation in offerings under those exemptions. For
example, the Commission enacted its "test the waters" rule, which permits an issuer in a Regulation
A offering to solicit broadly for indications of interest in the offering even before the issuer files
an offering statement with the Commission. 17 C.F.R. § 230.254 (2014). State regulators strongly
opposed the adoption of the "test the waters" rule. See Mark A. Sargent, A Future for Blue Sky Law,
62 U. CIN. L. REV. 471, 477-79 (1993); Marc I. Steinberg, The Emergence of State Securities Laws:
Partly Sunny Skiesfor Investors, 62 U. CIN. L. REV.395, 408-Iz (1993). With regard to offerings under
the intrastate exemption provided by Rule 147, the Commission takes the position, for example, that
an issuer in an intrastate offering may advertise interstate for investors (i.e., engage in conduct that
would otherwise be considered an interstate offer), so long as the solicitation makes clear that the
offer is limited to intrastate investors only. See Exemption for Local Offerings From Registration,
Securities Act Release No. 4434,26 Fed. Reg. 11,896, 11,897 (Dec.13, 1961) (to be codified at 17 C.ER.
Pt. 23) (offers under the intrastate exemption "may be made the subject of general newspaper
advertisement (provided the advertisement is appropriately limited to indicate that offers to
purchase are solicited only from, and sales will be made only to, residents of the particular State
involved)").
41 National Securities Markets Improvement Act (NSMIA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290,
io Stat. 3416 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
42 An interesting historical fact is that, as originally introduced, the legislation that became
NSMIA didpreempt state authority over the registration of securities offered under section 3(b) of
the 1933 Securities Act. However, this provision was dropped from the final version of NSMIA,
resulting in only Rule 506 preempting state authority for offerings; thus, Rule 5o6 became the only
meaningful preemption for small issuers attempting to access external capital. See Rutheford B
Campbell,Jr., 73e Impact ofNSMIA on Smalllssuers, 53 Bus. LAW. 575,582-83 (1998).
43 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b) (201z) (defining "covered securities,"which are the securities offered by
an issuer with regard to which state registration authority over offerings is preempted).
44 State registration of offerings under Rule 147 or Regulation A was always possible, and,
over time, states have attempted to provide efficient registration options for offerings exempt from
federal registration. Not surprisingly, coordinating a federal exemption with a state registration
has never worked. Expenses generated by state registration-especially when multiple states are
involved-are prohibitively high. See Campbell, A Moderate Capital, supra note 4, at 107-10.
820 [ Vol. 102
2013- 2014] SMALL BUSINESS CAPITAL FORMATION
small offering exemptions imposed very harsh limits on the number of offerees
or purchasers.45 Accredited investor exemptions normally imposed wealth or
insider requirements on purchasers that limited the issuer's search for external
capital to a very small percentage of the total population.4
The second, related legal problem before the passage of the JOBS Act
for small issuers in search of external capital was the result of the multiple,
separate registration regimes imposed by state blue sky laws. Not only did these
state blue sky laws effectively prohibit small businesses' wide solicitation for
investors, as described above, but also, more generally, complying with multiple
registration regimes drove up legal (and other) expenses to levels that rendered
small businesses unable to compete in the market for external capital. An
offering in a single state meant that the issuer must underwrite the costs of
compliance with two separate registration regimes. An offering in fifty states
meant that the issuer encountered the costs of meeting the requirements of
fifty-one separate registration regimes. 47
The stifling expense generated by the obligation to meet multiple,
independent registration regimes was the most pernicious of the legal
impediments to external capital faced by small businesses before the enactment
of the JOBS Act. For example, multiple, independent state registration regimes
governing small business capital formation activities practically eliminated
small businesses'use of more efficient exemptions from federal registration.
Consider first Regulation A. Before the JOBS Act, Regulation A offered
small businesses an exemption from registration that appeared to be both sound
as a matter of policy and attractive for small businesses. 48 Broadly, Regulation
A offered an exemption for the offer and sale of securities by non-reporting
companies. The offerings were limited to $5 million and required issuers to
provide investors with closely tailored investment information. The disclosure
obligations were sensitive to the preclusive effects of high, relative transaction
costs and thus required significantly less disclosures than were required in
registered offerings. Regulation A also permitted broad public offerings and
45 See, e.g., UNIF. SEC. ACT § 4 02(b)( 9 ), 7C U.L.A. 220 (2002). For a discussion of the states'
small offering exemption, see also Campbell, Blue Sky Laws, supra note 21, at 187-88.
46 See, e.g., 8o8 Ky. ADMIN. REGS. 10:340 § I (20I4) (incorporating by reference the federal
"accredited investor" definition from Regulation D into Kentucky's regulatory exemption from
registation for offers limited to accredited investors); see also Justin Bryan, High-Income Tax Returns
for 2007, SOI BULL. (Internal Revenue Serv., Wash., D.C.), Spring 2010, at 3, 4 fig.A, availahle at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/osprbul.pdf (demonstrating that 3.17 2%.of tax returns according to
Internal Revenue Service data for 2007 reported income of $200,000 or more).
47 Attempts over the years at achieving uniformity among state blue sky laws have proven
fruitless. See, e.g.,'Iherese H. Maynard, The Uniform Limited Offering Exemption: How "Uniform" is
"Uniform?"-An Evaluation and Critique of the ULOE, 36 EMORY L. J. 357, 509 (987) (describing
the lack of uniformity among states adopting the Uniform Limited Offering Exemption); see also
Campbell, A Moderate Capital, supra note 4, io7-08 (describing the failed attempt by states to
develop a uniform registration statement for offerings by small issuers).
48 See Campbell,A Moderate Capital, supra note 4, at 77,79-81, 99-105 (describing Regulation
A and its attractiveness to small businesses).
821
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
even permitted small businesses the opportunity to "test the waters"by soliciting
indications of interest before constructing and filing the required disclosure
documents.4 1
At the time the JOBS Act was signed into law, however, this apparently
attractive exemption was essentially unused by small businesses.
Table II provides information regarding the use of Regulation A during two
time periods before the JOBS Act.
TABLE II
Total Number of
Regulation A Offerings
Average Annual Number
of Regulation A Offerings
Time Periods During the Period During the Period
1/1/95 - 12/31/04 78 7.8
1/1/05 - 1/1/11 162 23.1
The data show that the millions of small businesses that needed external
capital to compete and survive in their respective product markets were not
utilizing this apparently attractive federal exemption from registration.
The principal reason for the non-use of Regulation A was the legal obligation
to comply with the multiple, separate registration requirements imposed by
state blue sky laws. A broad solicitation for investors in a Regulation A offering
may require compliance with fifty-one different registration regimes-fifty
state regimes and one federal regime-and this drove offering costs to a level
that destroyed the attractiveness of the exemption.
One finds similar data regarding the use (or non-use) of the exemptions
from federal registration provided by Regulation D. The data show small issuers
migrating from cost efficient ways of meeting federal registration requirements
to more expensive paths with many fewer potential investors, this due to the
impact of state registration requirements.
Regulation D52 represents a rational attempt by the Commission to balance
capital formation with investor protection. The exemptions in Regulation D
are based on an understanding (as described above) that relative offering
49 Id. at ioo-o6.
50 Search of Historical SEC EDGAR Archives, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/srch-
edgar?text=t-a&first=19948dast=2004&mode=Simple (last visited Apr. 5, 2014). Data for this
period were first retrieved and published in Campbell, A Moderate Capital, supra note 4, at 83-
51 Regulation A data were obtained from the subscription only Knowledge Mosaic website.
See FormA Data, KNOWLEDGE Mosmc,supra note 29 (follow "SEC Filings"hyperlink; then search
"Form 1-A").
52 Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.500-.5o8 (2014 ).The Commission adopted Rules 5oi-5o6
in Revision of Certain Exemptions from Registration for Transactions Involving Limited Offers
and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 6389,47 Fed. Reg. 11,251 (Mar. 16, 1982) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pt s. 230 & 239). Regulation D now consists of Rule 501 through Rule 508. Rules 501-503
and Rules 507-508 are general rules of support for the exemptions found in Rules 504 through 5o6.
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expenses can make it difficult or even impossible for small businesses to access
external capital. A related premise for Regulation D is that investor protection
provisions-offeree/purchaser qualification requirements and mandated
disclosures-are expensive for issuers.
Thus, one finds a stepped approach to requirements for investor protection
provisions in Regulation D, an approach that requires more investor protection
as the offering size increases.
Under the provisions of Regulation D, offerings up to $1 million can be
made under Rule 50453 without any disclosure obligations or offeree/purchaser
qualification requirements; offerings of up to $5 million under Rule 505,54
however, may require disclosures; and offerings of unlimited size under
Rule 506ss may require additional disclosures and investor qualification.
The point here is that Regulation D, specifically Rule 504 and Rule 505,
were designed to provide relatively low cost access to external capital for small
issuers. Data demonstrate, however, that Regulation D has not worked the way
the Commission intended.
Although issuers with small external capital needs were certainly using
Regulation D prior to the JOBS Act,56 data also show that issuers offering
small amounts of securities overwhelmingly abandoned Rule 504 and
Rule 505, making their small offerings, instead, under the more complicated
and expensive terms of Rule 506.
Table III, immediately below, shows the extent to which Regulation D
offerings of $1 million or less relied on Rule 504, the Regulation D exemption
specifically designed for such small offerings.s"
TABLE III
Regulation D Offerings of $1 Regulation D Offerings
Million or Less Offered Under of $1 Million of Less
Rule 504 Offered Under Rule 506
Percentage 14.3% 78.6%
Number 1,125/7,889 6,196/7,880
53 17 C.F.R. § 230.504.
54 17 C.F.R. § 230.505.
55 17 C.F.R. § 230.506.
56 Data show, for example, that in one twenty-six month period more than 27,000 Form Ds
were filed in connection with Regulation D offerings. Campbell, 7he Wreck ofRegulation D, supra
note 26, at 926 tbl.I. Regulation D data were obtained from the Knowledge Mosaic website. See
Form D Data, KNOWLEDGE MOSAIC, supra note 29 (follow "Form D"hyperlink, then search "Form
D"). The data are for Form D filings from September 15, 2008 to October i8, zoio. Form D filings
claiming multiple Regulation D exemptions were not included in the data used in my Business
Lawyer article, see Campbell, The Wreck ofRegulation D, supra note 26, or in this paper.
57 Campbell, The Wreck ofRegulation D, supra note 26, at 928 tbl.III.
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Table IV, immediately below, shows the extent to which Regulation D
offerings of S1 million to $5 million relied on Rule 505, the Regulation D
exemption specifically designed for such offerings.ss
TABLE IV
Regulation D Offerings Regulation D Offerings
of $1 to $5 Million Offered of $1 to $5 Million
Under Rule 505 Offered Under Rule 506
Percentage 3.9% 91.6%
Number 276/7,059 6,487/7,059
The data from Table III and Table IV show that issuers prior to the
JOBS Act overwhelmingly abandoned the attractive, balanced and closely
tailored Regulation D exemptions provided by Rule 504 and Rule 505 and
relied instead on Rule 506, with its disclosure obligations and its requirements
regarding the qualification of investors.
Data in Table V, immediately below, also show that small offerings
repositioned under Rule 506 were overwhelmingly limited to accredited
investors.59
TABLE V
Offerings of $1 Million or Less Offerings of $1 Million to$5 MillionMade Under Rule 506 $ iloMadeUnde Rul 506 Made Under Rule 506 and
and Limited to Accredited M ted to Accre d
InvetorsLimited to AccreditedInvestorsInvestors
Percentage 88.3% 91.8%
Number 203/230 191/208
'The discussion and the data in this Part I support the conclusion that in
the pre-JOBS Act period small businesses were significantly, unfairly, and
inefficiently disadvantaged in regard to their access to vital external capital.
The size and nature of small issuers meant that financial intermediation was
unavailable and their relative offering expenses were typically very high.
58 Id. at 928 tbl.IV.
59 The data in Table V first appeared in Campbell, 7he Wreck ofRegulation D, supra note 26,
at 93o tbl.VII. Table V is based on a sample of iooo Regulation D filings that were obtained from
SEC filings between September Y5 and October 12 of 20o. See Form D Data, KNOWLEDGE MOSAC,
supra note 29 (follow "Form D" hyperlink; then search "Form D" for Filing Date Range beginning
on 9/15/20io and ending on 1o/12/2oro). The manner in which Mosaic collected and grouped the
Form D data regarding accredited investors made it practically impossible to use the approximately
27,ooo samples used in Tables III and IV.
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State and federal registration requirements on small business capital formation
activities also throttled a wide search for investors and imposed on small
businesses multiple (expensive) registration regimes. Those legal obstacles
exacerbated small businesses'structural and economic disadvantages. As a result
of state and federal securities laws, small businesses, struggling under the burden
of high relative transaction costs and the absence of financial intermediation,
were effectively prohibited from engaging in a wide search for external capital
and subjected to stifling expense of multiple, independent regulatory regimes.
Part II of this Article discusses the extent to which the JOBS Act addresses
the special circumstances of small businesses and ameliorates their disadvantages
in the capital markets.
II. THE IMPACT OF THE JOBS ACT ON SMALL BUSINESSES
There is little doubt that the JOBS Act will have an impact on capital
formation activities and strategies.The question for this Article, however, is the
extent to which the JOBS Act facilitates efficient capital formation by small
businesses and whether any such benefit is greater than any loss in investor
protection as a result of the Act.
A. Title II of theJOBSAct: Access to Capitalfor Job Creators
Section 201 oftheJOBS Act directs the Commission to amend Regulation D
to permit general solicitation or general advertising for Rule 506 offerings,"
provided that all purchasers in such offerings are "accredited investors."6'
Although this legislation is not self-executing-it requires SEC action to
60 Before the JOBS Act, Rule 502(c), 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c), which was incorporated by
reference into Rule 5o6(b), 17 C.F.R. § 230.5 o6(b), prohibited general solicitation or general
advertising in Rule 506 offerings. See Use of Electronic Media, Securities Act Release No. 7856,
Exchange Act Release No. 42,728, Investment Company Act Release No. 24,426, 65 Fed. Reg.
25,843, 25,851-53 (May 4, 2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 231, 241 & 271) (discussing the
importance of a "pre-existing substantive relationship"with offerees as a way of demonstrating that
the offering did not involve a general solicitation or general advertising).
61 JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. I12-Io6, tit. II, § 201(a)(i), 126 Stat. 3o6,313-14 (2012) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77 d (2012)). The same section also directs the Commission in its rules to
'require the issuer to take reasonable steps to verify that purchasers of the securities are accredited
investors,"and further states that Rule 506 shall "continue to be treated as a regulation issued under
section 4(2) of the Securities Act of 19 33 ."Id. § 201(a)(i).
Section 20(a)(2) of the JOBS Act requires the Commission to enact regulations that permit
securities sold in Rule 144 A transactions to be "offered to persons other than qualified institutional
buyers, including by means of general solicitation or general advertising, provided that securities are
sold only to persons that the seller and any person acting on behalf of the seller reasonably believe
is a qualified institutional buyer."Id. § 2o1(a)(2) (emphasis added).
Section 201(b)(I) of the JOBS Act provides that the Rule 5o6 offerings using permissible
general solicitations or general advertising shall "not be deemed public offerings" and that persons
involved in running essentially passive, match-making platforms for listing these Rule 506 offerings,
for example, on an internet site, shall not be required to register as a broker or dealer. Id. § 20t(b)(I).
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become effective-Congress gave limited discretion to the Commission
regarding the regulatory implementation of Section 201. On July 10, 2013,
the Commission promulgated its final rules under Title II of the JOBS Act
by adding a new subsection (c) to Rule 506. The result is that offerings under
Rule 506(c) may now be made pursuant to a general advertising, provided that
all purchasers in the Rule 506(c) offering are accredited investors.62
Even before the JOBS Act eliminated the prohibition against general
advertising, Rule 506 offerings limited to accredited investors were very popular.
Empirical data show, for example, that over a recent 25-month period there
were 27,234 Regulation D offerings, and that 25,591 of those offerings (94%)
were made under Rule 506.6 Based on a smaller sample of 1000 Regulation D
filings, empirical data also show that the vast majority of all Regulation D
offerings, including Rule 506 offerings, were limited to accredited investors.
Within that smaller sample, 88.5% of all Regulation D offerings were limited
to accredited investors,64 and 91.2% of all Rule 506 offerings were limited to
accredited investors. 65
Amending Rule 506 to allow a broad solicitation for investors undoubtedly
will enhance the popularity of Rule 506 offerings even further. After the
Commission's rules implementing the JOBS Act, issuers relying on Rule 506(c)
and limiting purchasers to accredited investors essentially are subject only to the
special integration rules of Rule 502(a)66 and the modest holding period imposed
62 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(a)-(c) (2014). Rule 5o6 offerings involving non-accredited purchasers
continue to be subject to the prohibition against any general advertising.
63 Campbell, The Wreck ofRegulation D, supra note 26, at 926 tbl.I; see also Eliminating the
Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising in Rule 5o6 and Rule i44A
Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 9415, Exchange Act Release No. 69,959,78 Fed. Reg. 44,771,
44,788 (July 24, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 230, 239 & 242) ("Offerings conducted in reliance
on Rule 506 account for 99% of the capital reported as being raised under Regulation D from 2009
to 2012, and represent approximately 94% of the number of Regulation D offerings.").
64 Campbell, The Wreck ofRegulation D, supra note 26, at 929 tbl.V.
65 Id. at 929 tbl.VI. In the Release adopting the amendments to Rule 5o6 the Commission
stated "non-accredited investors reportedly purchased securities in only ii% of the Rule 5o6
offerings conducted between 2oo9 and 202." Eliminating the Prohibition Against General
Solicitation and General Advertising in Rule 506 and Rule i4 4 A Offerings, Securities Act Release
No. 9415, Exchange Act Release No. 69,959 , 78 Fed. Reg. at 44,792.
66 7 C.F.R. § 230.502(a) (2014). Securities Act Release No. 9 4 14 (July 1o, 203).'The same day
the Commission adopted amendments to Rule 5o6 permitting a general solicitation in Rule So6(c)
offerings, the Commission in a separate release also adopted "bad boy"provisions applicable to Rule
5o6 offerings. See Disqualification of Felons and Other "Bad Actors" From Rule 506 Offerings,
Securities Act Release No. 9414, 78 Fed. Reg. 44,730 (July 24, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
pts. 200, 230 & 239). Those provisions make the exemption provided by Rule 5o6 unavailable in
instances where the issuer or other parties with material management relationships with the issuer
or a material role in the distribution of the Rule 506 securities have, for example, been convicted of
illegal acts in connection with the offer and sale of securities. The application of bad boy provisions
to Rule 506 are unimportant with regard to the matter of whether small businesses have efficient
access to external capital. Id. at 44,749.
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by Rule 502(d).67 Importantly, such offerings made in reliance on Rule 506(c)
continue to enjoy preemption from the registration requirements of state blue
sky laws."5 Also, availability of the exemption provided by Rule 506(c) is not
predicated on disclosure of investment information to offerees or purchasers, 9
sophistication of offerees or purchasers," or any limit in the number of offerees
or purchasers. 7 1 Combining these attractive features with the right to solicit
broadly for investors will make Rule 506 even more attractive to businesses
searching for external capital.
Whether the changes in Rule 506 wrought by the JOBS Act are sound as a
matter of economic policy-that is,whether such changes in this very important
exemption from registration facilitate an efficient allocation of capital to small
businesses-may be more problematic, however.
After the JOBS Act amendments and regulatory implementation,
the only material investor protection device imposed as a condition for a
Rule 506(c) offering is the purchaser's status as an accredited investor.7' Thus
the issue-one which seems, at least to me, to have slipped under the radar for
decades 7 -is the extent to which accredited investor status is a sensible
67 17 C.F.R. § 23 0.502(d). For a discussion of the holding period in Rule So6 offerings
imposed by Rule 14, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144, see Rutheford B Campbell, Jr., Resales of Securities: The
New Rules and the New Approach of the SEC, 37 SEC. REG. L.J. 317 (2009) (Rule 144 imposes a one
year or six month holding period, depending on the circumstances).
On July so, 2013, the Commission proposed amendments for comment, principally to
Regulation D and Form D. Amendments to Regulation D, Form D and Rule 156, Securities Act
Release No. 9416, Exchange Act Release No. 69,960, Investment Company Act Release No. 3 0,595,
78 Fed. Reg. 44,8o6, 44,809-12 (proposed July 24 , 2013) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pts. 230 & 239).
The proposed amendments enhance the obligation to file Form Ds in connection with offerings
under Rule 5o6(c), id. at 44,851 (to be codified at 17 C.ER. § 230.503(a)(i), (a)(4)(v)), and expand
the amount of information required in such Form D filings, id. at 44,852-55 (to be codified at Form
D,17 C.ER. § 239-500). The proposed amended regulations also require general solicitations under
new Rule 506(c) to contain certain legends, id. at 44,852 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.509(a)),
and a temporary obligation to submit written offering materials to the Commission, id. at 44,852
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.5 1oT).
68 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)( 4 )(E) (2012).
69 17 C.F.R. § 23 0.5 02(b). As described in note 67, supra, the Commission has proposed
amendments to Rule 5o6 and Form D that would require issuers using Rule 5o6(c) to provide
investors with prescribed legends and to file with the Commission offering circulars (if any) used
in connection with such offerings.
70 Purchasers under Rule 506 must be either sophisticated ("capable of evaluating the merits
and risks of the prospective investment") or accredited. 17 C.F.R. § 23 0.506(b)(2)(ii) (2014).
7, See 17 C.ER. § 23 0.506(b)(2)(i); see also id. § 23 0-5 02(b)(2)(ii) (excluding accredited
investors from the limitation on number of purchasers under Regulation D).
72 See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
73 The notion that wealth may be an appropriate consideration for private placements first
came to prominence in old Rule 146, 17 C.F.R. § 230.146, which required that all offerees either
be "capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment" or be "able to bear
the economic risk of the investment." See 17 C.FR. § 230.146 (1980). In its earliest guidance, the
Commission had emphasized other factors (e.g., number of offerees; size of the offering), which
did not include wealth. See also SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125-27 (1953) (emphasizing
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criterion for an exemption from the registration requirements of the 1933 Act.
More particularly, the issue is whether investor wealth, which is the primary
basis for accredited investor status, is an appropriate basis for an exemption
from the registration requirement of the 1933 Act.
Restated and framed in economic terms, the question is: Does an exemption
from registration based only on the wealth of the purchaser facilitate an efficient
allocation of capital? While it seems certain that this change in Rule 506 creates
an economic benefit by lowering transaction costs in accessing external capital,
the exemption may, on the other hand, generate economic costs by increasing
the probability that investors in such cases lack the skill and information
necessary to allocate their capital to its highest and best use.
One can, of course, argue either side of this issue. One may argue, for
example, that wealthy people do not necessarily have access to the same kind
of information that would be found in a registration statement. On the other
hand, it may be reasonable to assume that wealth amounts to an acceptable
approximation of an investor's ability to "fend for himself." Wealthy investors
may be presumptively smart and have the economic juice to extract investment
information. Also, of course, they may be able to hire investment advisors to
help them evaluate the merits and risks of an investment.
It has always seemed curious to me that we have never had a vigorous
conversation about this controversial matter. Nonetheless, if one assumes that
wealth provides an appropriate level of investor protection,7 4 then permitting a
general solicitation in Rule 506(c) offerings makes economic and policy sense.
In essence, the amended Rule 506 imposes the investor protection
device-in this case, accredited investor status-at the point of purchase
rather than the point of offer. This enables the issuer to make a broad and
efficient search for external capital without generating any additional, material
risks to either the offerees or the purchasers in the Rule 506(c) offering. The
unaccredited offerees are unharmed by the general solicitation, since they are
not permitted to purchase. The ultimate investors (the accredited purchasers)
suffer no harm as a result of offers having been made to unaccredited investors
who do not purchase, and the accredited purchasers themselves presumptively
factors such as "needs" of offerees for the protection of the 1933 Act, ability of offerees to "fend for
themselves,""access to the same kind of information . .. [found in] a registration statement," and
"knowledge of the offerees."); Letter of General Counsel Discussing the Factors to be Considered
in Determining the Availability of the Exemption from the Registration Provided by the Second
Clause of Section 4(l), Securities Act Release No. 285, 11 Fed. Reg. 10,952 (Jan. 24, 1935); 1 Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 274I-2744 (Jan. 24, 1935).
74 Framing this in the Supreme Court's language in SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., wealth may
amount to an acceptable proxy for investors' ability to "fend for themselves" or investors'"access to
the same kind of information ... [found in] a registration statement."346 U.S. at 125-27.
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are protected by their accredited status" and by antifraud provisions in federal
securities laws. 6
In short, assuming that investor wealth is an appropriate basis for an
exemption from registration, Rule 506(c) amounts to a rational and efficient
balance of capital formation and investor protection. Efficient capital formation
is enhanced by the ability of issuers to solicit broadly, and investors are protected
by limiting purchasers to wealthy investors.
The problem with the JOBS Act, therefore, is not that it allows a wide
solicitation for investors in Rule 506(c) offerings. The problem is that the
JOBS Act does not extend that model-permitting a broad solicitation
for investors, imposing investor protection devices at the point of purchase,
and eliminating state authority over registration-to other exemptions from
registration.
Small businesses have an especially compelling need for the extension of
this efficient model to exempt offerings made in reliance on Rule 147n1 (the
intrastate exemption), Rule 504,n7 Rule 505,7 and Regulation A. 0
Although small businesses can use new Rule 506(c), accredited investors
amount to a very small percentage of the entire population and an especially
challenging cohort of investors for small businesses. While it is difficult to
come up with exact quantified data on this, it may be that less than five percent
of the general population would meet the present definition of "accredited
investor.""' Limiting investors to such a small percentage of the population
presents disproportionate difficulties for small businesses, which normally have
small capital requirements and are located, in many instances, outside major
population centers and distant from a significant pool of wealthy investors.
For small businesses to be able to compete for external capital, they
need other efficient exemptions from registration that are not limited to
75 No doubt, permitting a general advertising or general solicitation without imposing an
investor protection device at this offer stage will draw criticism from some as exacerbating the
chance of fraud. For example, in reporting comments received in response to the proposed SEC
rule permitting general solicitations and advertising in connection with a Rule 506 offering, the
Commission reported that some "commenters expressed concern that the proposed amendment,
if adopted, would increase the risk of fraudulent and abusive Rule 5o6 offerings." Eliminating the
Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising in Rule So6 and Rule 14 4 A
Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 9415, Exchange Act Release No. 69,959, 78 Fed. Reg. 44,771,
44,775 (July 24, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 230, 239 & 242). For the reasons articulated in the
textual discussion, such criticisms are unpersuasive.
76 As an obvious example, an issuer's misstatement or omission of a material fact in
connection with its sale of its securities may generate serious criminal and civil liability for the
issuer as a result of a violation of Rule iob-5.17 C.F.R. § 24 0.iob-S (2014).
77 Rule 147, 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (204)-
78 17 C.ER. § 230.504 (204).
79 17 C.F.R. § 230-505 (2014).
80 Regulation A, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.255-.263 (2014).
81 Internal Revenue Service data from 2007 show that only 3.172% of all tax returns reported
income of $200,000 or more. Bryan, supra note 46, at 4 fig.A.
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accredited investors. As described earlier in this Article,1 none of the other
attractive exemptions from registration presently available for small business
financing-the intrastate exemption of Rule 147, Rule 504, Rule 505 and
Regulation A-provide small businesses with an efficient access to external
capital. Issuers offering securities under these exemptions are neither able to
solicit broadly nor free from state authority over registration.
'The amendment to Rule 506 permitting a broad solicitation in Rule 506(c)
offerings will be warmly received in some quarters and, as The Wall Street
journal predicted, "unleash a wave of ads."" Whether small businesses will
materially benefit from the change is perhaps less clear. The Wall StreetJournal
article referenced immediately above was entitled: SEC Set To Erase Ad Block
On Funds, and it highlighted the impact of the new Rule 506(c) on "hedge
funds [and] private-equity firms."84
While the benefit of Rule 506(c) on truly small businesses may be more
modest than the impact on large funds, the amendment implements a sound
overall philosophy, which should provide a model for a reevaluation of other
exemptions from registration that are (or should be) important to small
businesses. Specifically, new Rule 506(c) permits issuers to solicit broadly for
external capital, imposes investor protection devices at sale (not at offer), and
relieves issuers-especially important to small businesses-from the pernicious
effects of state registration requirements. That balance enhances capital
formation while ensuring that investors are protected.
It is a model worth replicating in other exemptions.
B. Title III of the JOBS Act: Crowdfunding
Title III of the JOBS Act" (the Crowdfiinding Act) authorizes an exemption
from registration for the offer and sale of securities through a technique that
has come to be called crowdfunding. The Crowdfunding Act is intended to
provide a statutory structure within which small companies are able to raise a
relatively modest amount of capital through unregistered offerings conducted
over the internet.8 6
82 See supra notes 30-61 and accompanying text.
83 Andrew Ackerman &Jessica Holzer, SEC Set to EraseAd Block on Funds, WALL ST.J.,July
10, 2013, at C 3 .
8 4 Id
85 Capital Raising Online While Deterring Fraud and Unethical Non-Disclosure Act of
2012 (CROWDFUND Act), Pub. L. 112-106, tit. III, 126 Stat. 315 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of iS U.S.C.).
86 Crowdfunding attracted academic attention both before and after the enactment of the
JOBS Act. See C. Steven Bradford, 7e New Federal Crowdfunding Exemption: Promise Unfulfiled,
40 SEC. REG. L.J. 195 (2012); Stuart R. Cohn, 7he New Crowdfunding Registration Exemption: Good
Idea, Bad Execution, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1433 (2012); Joan MacLeod Heminway & Shelden Ryan
Hoffman, Proceed at Your Peril: Crowdfunding and the Securities Act ofp9p3, 78 TENN. L. REv. 879
(2on); Andrew A. Schwartz, Crowdfunding Securities, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1457 (2013).
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The Crowdfunding Act" is a blend of mandatory statutory provisions that
must be met in any offering under the exemption provided by the Act and a
delegation of authority to the Commission to enact rules respecting the terms
of the exemption. The mandatory provisions of the Crowdfunding Act include
limitations on the aggregate amount that may be sold under the exemption
and on the amount that may be purchased by any single investor. Generally
stated, the mandatory statutory provisions of the Crowdfunding Act include a
$1 million dollar limitation on total sales by the issuer" and a limitation on the
maximum amount of purchases by any single investor of between $2000 and
$100,000, depending on the circumstances."
The Act requires that the issuer's crowdfunding transaction be conducted
exclusively through the website of a broker or a "funding portal"o (intermediaries
or financial intermediaries) that meets strict statutory requirements. The Act
also prohibits the issuers from advertising the crowdfunding offer, "except for
notices which direct investors to the funding portal or broker.""
Finally, the Crowdfunding Act requires that the issuer, at the time of
the offering, disclose to investors and file with the Commission a significant
amount of investment information, including financial information,92 and
delegates to the Commission the authority to require "other information as
the Commission may by rule prescribe."" The Act requires that the offering be
followed by some form of periodic reporting by the issuer, although the statute
leaves broad discretion to the Commission to define the nature and extent of
this obligation of the issuer.94
87 CROWDFUND Act § 302(a), S U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6) (2o2); id. § 302(b), 15 U.S.C. §
77d-1.
88 Id § 302(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(A) ("[A]ggregate amount sold to all investors ... during
the 12-month period ... is not more than si,ooo,ooo.").
89 Id. § 302(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7 7d(a)(6)(B). The maximum amount that any single investor may
purchase from an issuer under the exemption "during the 12 month period" cannot exceed: (i) if
the investor's annual income or net worth is less than sioo,ooo, the greater of 82,000 or 5% of the
investor's annual income or net worth; "and" (ii) if the investor's net income or net worth is more
than sioo,ooo, io% of the investor's annual income or net worth, "as applicable," not to exceed
sioo,ooo. Id.
90 Id. § 302(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7 7d(a)(6)(C). "Funding Portal" is defined to limit the portal's
activities essentially to the passive facilitation of the flow of investment information between
the issuer and potential investors. JOBS Act § ioi(b)(2) (202), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(80) (2012). For
example, the funding portal cannot provide "investment advice,""solicit purchases," or compensate
its employees bases on sales, meaning no commissions can be paid. Id.
91 CROWDFUND Act § 3 02(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77 d-i(b)(2).
92 Id. § 302(b), 15 US.C. § 7 7d-I(b)()(A)-(H).
93 Id § 3 02(b), 15 US.C. § 7 7d-i(b)(i)(I).
94 The Crowdfunding Act requires the issuer to "not less than annually, file with the
Commission and provide to investors reports of the results of operations and financial statements
of the issuer, as the Commission shall, by rule, determine appropriate, subject to such exceptions
and termination dates as the Commission may establish, by rule."Id. § 302(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77d-i(b)
(4).
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The Crowdfunding Act-indeed, the entire crowdfunding movement-is
not without its challenges. It was clear from the beginning that any regulatory
implementation of the Act by the Commission would be contentious. In
the first place, parties on both sides of this matter-those who believe in
regulatory intrusion into the free market for securities and those who believe
otherwise-are deeply invested in their positions, vocal, not without forums
in which to express their views, and, indeed, at least in some instances, not
without political influence. Secondly, the implementation of the Act involves a
clash of cultures, a clash between the traditions prevalent in world of securities
regulators (the Commission, for example) and the traditions in the world of
technology entrepreneurs. New financial intermediaries are certain to appear
and, at least in many cases, be managed by technology entrepreneurs who
have little experience in (or patience with) the more risk adverse traditions of
regulators of securities.
It was also clear from the beginning that the mandatory provisions of the
Act itself may make it difficult for the Commission to construct an efficient
regulatory crowdfunding regime for small businesses in search of external
capital.
Notwithstanding such practical and regulatory challenges, my view was,
and continues to be, that the fundamentals of the Crowdfunding Act are, at
least in a broad sense, sound. The Act offers the Commission the opportunity
to construct a new exemption from registration that enables small businesses
to solicit broadly and efficiently for external capital through the use of modern
technology. The Act, at least as a general matter, provides the Commission a
rational (albeit challenging) framework for a disclosure regime that balances the
capital formation needs of small issuers with investor protection. The Act does
not, either as a matter oflanguage or practical effect, limit investors to accredited
investors, and the Act enables small businesses to solicit for external capital free
from the debilitating effect of state registration laws and regulations."
Stated somewhat alternatively, properly implemented by the Commission,
the Act increases the opportunities for small businesses to attain a new form
of financial intermediation, one that may be reasonably priced and broadly
available," and one that facilitates small businesses' efficient access to external
capital.
The Commission has now promulgated its first iteration of proposed
regulations (crowdfinding regulations) under the Crowdfunding Act.97 While
this first iteration may offer a sensible path for some offerings by some small
95 The Crowdfunding Act amended the 1933 Act to preempt state registration authority over
securities offered under the crowdfunding exemption. Id. § 305(a), is U.S.C. § 77r(b)( 4 )(C).
96 For data regarding the use of financial intermediation offerings of si millon or less under
Regulation D, see supra Table I.
97 See Crowdfunding, Securities Act Release No. 9470, Exchange Act Release No. 70741, 78
Fed. Reg. 66,4_28 (proposed Nov. 5, 2013) (to be codified at V7 C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240 &
249).
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businesses-particularly offerings in amounts at or near the one million dollar
limit imposed by the Crowdfunding Act-the crowdfunding regulations
fail to achieve along the entire range of the exemption the essential balance
between capital formation and investor protection.The proposed crowdfunding
regulations also are plagued by legal technicalities that will make it difficult for
small businesses to take full advantage of the exemption from registration.
For the crowdfunding regulations to work-to provide an appropriate access
to external capital for small businesses-relative offering costs (offering costs as
a percentage of proceeds from the offering) in crowdfunding transactions must
be at a level that is rational and economically efficient. As described earlier,
offering costs that amount to a large percentage of the total offering may kill
the deal.98
Three types of offering costs generated by the Crowdfunding Act and the
proposed crowdfinding regulations can be identified. First and most apparent
are the costs generated by the mandatory disclosure requirements of the
Crowdfunding Act and the proposed crowdfunding regulations. Second are
the opportunity costs that may be generated by the requirement that the issuer
of securities under the Crowdfiinding Act and regulations forego the use of any
other type of offering. Finally, there are the costs to small businesses relying on
the crowdfunding exemption that result from their obligations to ensure that
the financial intermediaries they use are compliant with the Crowdfunding Act
and the proposed regulations.
Consider first the costs of the mandatory disclosure required by the Act and
the proposed regulations. Setting the efficient level of mandatory disclosure
is certainly the most difficult decision for the Commission in connection
with its regulatory implementation of the Crowdfunding Act, and I fear the
Commission has missed it badly in this first iteration.
There are two disclosure obligations in the crowdfunding regulations: the
ex ante obligation, which is the obligation to provide investment information
at the point of offer and sale, and the ex post obligation, which is the obligation
to provide continuing information after the offering is completed.
Considering first the ex ante disclosure obligations, one finds, depending
on how one counts, that the proposed crowdfinding regulations require
issuers to provide the Commission and investors with approximately twenty
categories of financial and non-financial investment information." I see in
these requirements soaring relative offering costs'-especially for offerings
of less than $500,000-generated by the amount and, at least in some cases,
the nature of information that is required to be disclosed and by the practical
necessity of the issuer's engaging expensive professionals in constructing the
98 See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
99 Crowdfunding, Securities Act Release No. 9470, Exchange Act Release No. 70741,78 Fed.
Reg. at 66,552-54 (proposed Nov. 5, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 227.201(a)-(v)).
io For an explanation and discussion of "relative offering costs," see supra notes 20-2x and
accompanying text.
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required disclosures. In short, I am unable to find an efficient regulatory balance
between small business capital formation and investor protection.
The sheer volume, detail, and practical complexity of this ex ante disclosure
information is perhaps even more vivid-and thus daunting-when viewed
through the lens of one who has written disclosure documents required by the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Act of 1934. A few examples out of the
twenty or so categories of information will make the point. Risk factors must
be disclosed,' and initially identifying the issuer's risk factors and constructing
the required disclosures is a matter that necessarily will involve significant
time from the issuer's counsel."0 2 Required disclosure about "ownership and
capital structure" are especially challenging.03 Six separate disclosures are
required, including how the rights of principal shareholders could impact
crowdfunding investors,'10 4 "[h]ow the [crowdfunding] securities ... are being
valued, and examples of methods for how such securities may be valued by the
issuer in the future, including during subsequent corporate actions"' and a
description of the special risks of minority ownership.0 6 Finally, there is the
obligation for a narrative "description of the financial condition of the issuer," 07
a requirement that seems to be a first cousin to the "Management's Discussion
and Analysis"' required, for example, in Form 10-Ks that are filed under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.109
101 Crowdfiinding, Securities Act Release No. 9470, Exchange Act Release No. 70741,78 Fed.
Reg. at 66,552 (proposed Nov.5 ., 203) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 22 7 .20(f)).
102 One practical point regarding the costs of meeting the crowdfusnding disclosures should
be made. It is likely a small business utilizing the crowdfunding exemption will be an unseasoned
issuer-one that for the first time is preparing offering documents required by securities regulators.
This makes it likely that outside counsel will literally draft the whole of the disclosure rather than-
as is typical in an offering by a seasoned issuer-merely reviewing the work of the issuer itself. This
significantly increases attorney fees for the crowdfunding issuer. Drafting risk disclosures offers an
example of this. A seasoned issuer, one for example that is reporting under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, can simply update and revise as necessary its "Risk Factors" section from a prior
Commission filing. Obviously, such a low cost disclosure is impossible in a crowdfunding offering.
103 Crowdfunding, Securities Act Release No. 9470, Exchange Act Release No. 70741, 78 Fed.
Reg. at 66,552-53 (proposed Nov. 5,2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 227.20I(m)).
104 Id. at 66,552 (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. § 227.201(m)(2)).
105 Id. at 66,552-53 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 227.201(m)(4)). This disclosure will involve
complex present value calculations and an understanding and disclosure of future reorganizations
and how such transactions may impact shareholder wealth.
1o6 Id. at 66,553 (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. § 227.20I(m)(5)) (requiring disclosure of "[t]
he risks . . . to minority ownership in the issuer and the risks associated with corporate actions
including additional issuances of securities, issuer repurchases of securities, a sale of the issuer or of
assets of the issuer or transactions with related parties").
107 Id. (to be codified at 17 C.ER. § 227.20I(s)).
108 17 C.F.R. § 229-303 (2014).
109 Form so-K, 17 C.F.R. § 249-310 (2014).
834 [ VOL. 1o2
2013- 2014] SMALL BUSINESS CAPITAL FORMATION
The ex ante disclosures required by the proposed crowdfunding regulations
also include financial statements.' The financial statements provided to
investors and the Commission must "include a balance sheet, income statement,
statement of cash flows and statement of changes in owners' equity and notes
to financial statements prepared in accordance with U.S. generally accepted
accounting principles," and the financial statements must cover at least two
years or since the inception of the company."'1 The Commission's crowdfunding
regulations, consistent with the Crowdfiinding Act,112 offer a modest, stepped
approach to the certification or audit requirements of these financial statements.
For offerings of $100,000 or less, the statements must be "certified by the
principal executive officer of the issuer to be true and complete in all material
respects;" for offerings between $100,000 and $500,000, the statements must
be "reviewed by a public accountant who is independent of the issuer," and for
offerings between $500,000 and $1,000,000, the financial statements must be
"audited by a public accountant who is independent of the issuer.""'
The burden of the foregoing ex ante required narrative and
financial disclosures is significantly increased by the obligation in the
proposed crowdfunding regulations"4 for the issuer to provide ex post
disclosures-extensive and protracted post-offering disclosures that seem
modeled on the periodic disclosures under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. These ex post disclosures raise total offering costs and may, in fact, be
the most daunting for all disclosures for small businesses seeking to use the
crowdfunding exemption. Essentially, the issuer is required annually to provide
all the information-including financial information- required ex ante at the
point of offering, except for information about the nature and terms of the
original offering."s This periodic reporting may go on forever."' It is difficult
to see how any small issuer would knowingly agree to such terms. It is even
more difficult to see any policy supporting such an extensive and protracted
no Crowdfiinding, Securities Act Release No. 9470, Exchange Act Release No.70741,78 Fed.
Reg. at 66,553 (proposed Nov. 5, 2013) (to be codified at V7 C.F.R. § 227.201(t)).
ni Id. (to be codified at 17 C.ER. § 227.20(t)(Instruction 2)).
112 CROWDFUND Act § 302(b) (2012),15 U.S.C. § 77d-i(b)(i)(D) (2012).
13 Crowdfunding, Securities Act Release No. 9470, Exchange Act Release No. 70741,78 Fed.
Reg. at 66,553 (proposed Nov. 5, 2013) (to be codified at V C.ER. § 227.201(t)(1)-(3)).
114 The Crowdfusnding Act delegates broadly to the Commission the authority to dictate the
terms of this annual reporting obligation. CROWDFUND Act § 302(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77d-i(b)( 4)
(imposing an obligation to file such annual reports "as the Commission shall, by rule, determine
appropriate, subject to such exceptions and termination dates as the Commission may establish,
by rule").
115 Crowdfisnding, Securities Act Release No. 9470, Exchange Act Release No. 70741,78 Fed.
Reg. at 66,554 (proposed Nov. 5, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 227.202(a)).
n16 Id. (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 22 7 .202(b)) (stating that the issuer is obligated to
continue the annual filing until the issuer becomes a reporting company under the 1934 Act, the
issuer of a third party purchases all the securities issued in the crowdfuiding offering, or the issuer
dissolves itself).
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obligation. In short, the ex post disclosure obligations are significantly out of
balance.
The purpose here is not to provide a detailed, section by section analysis of
the disclosure requirements for a crowdfunding offering.'The purpose, instead,
it to provide a few of the more glaring examples of the Commission's loss of
balance in its crowdfunding regulations. 'he Commission in its first iteration
of its crowdfunding regulations has failed to appreciate the impact on small
issuers of the relative offering costs generated by the crowdfunding disclosure
obligations. For the new exemption to work, the Commission must step these
disclosure requirements, requiring less disclosures for small crowdfunding
offerings and more disclosures for larger crowdfunding offerings. Absent
such a stepped approach, the crowdfunding exemption will be functionally
unavailable for many offerings. Especially adversely impacted by the failure of
the Commission to adopt such a stepped approach will be offerings by small
business with small external capital needs, which seems exactly counter to the
whole purpose of the JOBS Act.
Another cost for issuers relying on the crowdfunding exemption is in the
nature of an opportunity cost and is principally the result of the impact of that
old and sinister concept of integration."7
The terms of the Crowdfunding Act require that the "issuer ... shall ... not
advertise the terms of the offering, except for notices which direct investors
to the funding portal or broker.""' The proposed crowdfunding regulations
reiterate this statutory prohibition, limiting the issuer's right to communicate
with investors to "communication channels provided by the intermediary on
the intermediary's platform."'
On its face, this limitation seems consistent with the balance struck by
crowdfunding exemption. Part of the investor protection for crowdfunding
investors is this limit on aggressive selling efforts by the intermediary or the
issuer.'Ihe Act and the crowdfunding regulations, therefore, essentially limit
permissible selling efforts to the electronic posting of the offer and providing
potential investors with disclosures of prescribed investment information.
117 See Rutheford B Campbell, Jr., The Overwhelming Case for Elimination of the Integration
Doctrine Under the Securities Act ofl933, 89 Ky. L.J. 289 (2oo) [hereinafter Campbell, Integration
Doctrine]. That article explains the integration concept as follows:
Under the integration doctrine, a single "offering" or"issue"of securities cannot be split.
... Accordingly, if an issuer attempts to bifurcate a single offering into two separate
components and qualify each corponent under a separate exemption ... , courts or the
Commission may conclude that the two putatively separate offerings in fact amount
to a single offering and thus may "integrate" the two transactions into a single offering.
Once this integration occurs, the breadth of the offering or issue is defined, and all the
offers and sales within this defined offer or issue must ... meet all the requirements of
a single exemption ....
Id. at 290-91.
118 CROWDFUND Act § 302(b), 15 U.S.C. § 7 7d-i(b)(2).
119 Crowdfinding, Securities Act Release No. 9470, Exchange Act Release No. 70741,78 Fed.
Reg. at 66,555 (proposed Nov. 5, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 227.204(c)).
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The problem, however, is that this tough limitation on selling strategies,
when considered together with the integration doctrine, may generate
significant opportunity costs for an issuer attempting to utilize the crowdfunding
exemption. In essence, it forecloses a small business issuer utilizing the
crowdfunding exemption from the opportunity to market its securities in
face-to-face transactions, even with local, accredited potential investors.
Consider, for example, a situation in which an issuer needs to raise $1 million
in external capital. If the issuer undertakes a crowdfunding offering in that case,
it could not engage in any face-to-face selling efforts with potential investors in
the issuer's community. To do so would likely be contrary to the limitation on
selling efforts, described above. Even if all the local potential investors were, for
example, accredited investors and thus qualified as investors under Rule 506,
offering and selling shares to such accredited investors would likely violate
Section 5 of the 1933 Act and destroy the crowdfinding exemption as well.
The reason is because of the integration doctrine. It seems certain that the two
components of the $1 million offering-the part of the offering sold on the
internet through the crowdfunding exemption and the part of the offering sold
in face-to-face transactions to accredited investors-would be integrated.120
If that happens, the integrated offering would meet neither the requirements
of the crowdfunding offering-since the issuer would seem to violate the
crowdfunding prohibition against advertising-nor the requirements for the
exemption provided by Rule 506-since the offering would include sales to
unaccredited investors over the Internet.
The result of this for the small business issuer is that it would have to choose
between an internet offering and a face to face offering. That is a significant
disadvantage for a small business struggling to raise capital, and requiring the
issuer to choose between crowdfunding and a Rule 506 offering advances no
economic or social policy, such as investor protection.
Integration, as I have argued in prior articles, has never made any sense.
If a crowdfunding offer is made, the bases for an exemption from registration
are disclosures and the limitation on aggressive selling techniques.'Ihe fact that
at the same time the issuer is also engaged in selling securities to accredited
investors under Rule 506 in no way harms or compromises the underlying
policy of the crowdfunding exemption. Nor do the crowdfunding sales
compromise the underlying policy of the exemption provided by Rule 506,
which is primarily based on the fact that all purchasers are accredited.12'
120 Regulation D has its own integration safe harbor. See 7 C.F.R. § 230.502(a) (2o 4 ). That
safe harbor, however, offers only one-way protection. That is, it protects only the Regulation D
offering and not, in the case I am hypothesizing, the crowdfunding offering. Also, the Regulation
D integration safe harbor protects only in instances where the two offerings are six months or more
apart. Id. (providing protection only in the case the offerings "are made more than six months"
apart).
121 Campbell, Integration Doctrine, supra note ir7, at 319-24 (providing examples
demonstrating the nonsense of applying integration in exempt offerings).
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While the Commission has seemed over time to recognize the lack of any
policy supporting the application of the integration concept by developing
a number of safe harbors from the application of the integration concept,'22
the crowdfunding regulations and the accompanying release proposing those
regulations are woefully lacking in regard to this important matter. 'The
Commission simply ignored this issue in its proposed crowdfunding regulations
by providing no integration safe harbor protection for crowdfunding. Instead,
curiously and inappropriately, the Commission in the release proposing the
crowdfunding regulations merely states what is apparently its opinion that "we
believe" there should be no integration.'23
The Commission needs a complete two-way integration safe harbor for all
crowdfinding offerings."4 While this will not be a simple matter to reduce to
a regulation, the Commission in its release has offered an approach that may
make some sense.'25 Efficient access to capital for a small business issuer using
the crowdfunding exemption requires that the small business at the same time
be allowed to deal with potential investors in a face to face manner.
Small business issuers relying on the exemption provided by the proposed
crowdfunding regulation will also encounter the costs generated by the risk
that the financial intermediary involved in the crowdfunding transaction is not
compliant with the Crowdfunding Act and the crowdfunding regulations. Both
the Act itself and the crowdfiinding regulations predicate the crowdfiinding
exemption on a "transaction [that] is conducted through [an intermediary] ...
that complies with the requirements of " the Crowdfunding Act." 6
The impact of this will require the issuer to take steps to ensure that the
intermediary has complied with all the steps necessary to meet the requirement
of a "broker" or a "funding portal."The amount of investigation the issuer takes
in order to ensure that the intermediary is compliant with the Crowdfunding
Act will certainly be based on a cost-benefit analysis by the small business
issuer. The cost to the small business issuer will include both the out of pocket
122 For a discussion of the Commission's regulatory integration safe harbors, see id. at 311-19.
123 Crowdfunding, Securities Act Release No. 9470, Exchange Act Release No. 70741, 78 Fed.
Reg. at 66,432.
124 It is interesting that the Commission has effectively neutralized the pernicious impact of
integration in the new Regulation A regulations but has failed so badly to neutralize the integration
problem in the Crowdfinding regulations. See infra note i49.
125 Crowdfunding, Securities Act Release No. 9470, Exchange Act Release No. 70741, 78
Fed. Reg. at 66,432. Footnote 33 is especially illuminating regarding the Commission's view on this
matter of integration. Id. at 66,432 n.33.
126 CROWDFUND Act § 302(a) (2012), 15 U.S.C. § 7 7d(a)(6)(C) (2012). The intermediary
requirements of the Crowdfunding Act are found at 15 U.S.C. § 77d-i.
The crowdfunding regulations require that the crowdfunding offering be "conducted through
an intermediary that complies with ... [the intermediary requirements of the Crowdfunding Act]
and the related requirements in Regulation Crowdfisnding."Crowdfunding, Securities Act Release
No. 9470, Exchange Act Release No. 70741, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,551 (proposed Nov. 4, 2013) (to be
codified at 7 C.F.R. § 22 7.ioo(a)(3)).
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expenses of any investigation and the residual negative value remaining after
investigation that, notwithstanding the investigation, the intermediary does not
actually meet the statutory requirements. Both amount to economic costs that
must be absorbed by the issuer.
The Commission should eliminate or significantly reduce this cost
through its crowdfunding regulations.'27 Society gains essentially nothing
by encouraging issuer expenditures to audit intermediary compliance with
intermediary obligations. Intermediary compliance with the intermediary's
statutory and regulatory obligations is best and most efficiently achieved by
penalties on the intermediary for its compliance failures. Penalties on issuers
for intermediary non-compliance are misdirected and increase offering costs
for small businesses.
The second and third of the offering costs describe immediately above-the
cost generated by the risk of integration in a crowdfunding offering and the
cost generated by the risk of the non-compliant intermediary-are easily dealt
with by the Commission through the exercise of its regulatory authority and
involve no difficult policy choices. Neither of those two costs generates any
benefit to society or the economy. Structuring an efficient level of disclosure, of
course, is more challenging, but it is a challenge well within the Commission's
expertise and experience.
C. Title IVof theJOBS Act ("Small Business Capital Formation")
and the Commission's Regulation A Rules
Section 3(b)(1) of the 1933 Act'28 delegates broad authority to the
Commission to enact regulatory exemptions from registration. The only
limitations on the Commission's authority are that the regulatory exemptions
cannot exceed $5 million and must be "in the public interest."129
The Commission, acting under this delegated; authority, enacted
Regulation A.13 0 Regulation A allows the issuer to make a public offering of its
127 The first iteration of the crowdfinding regulations provides that there will be no loss of
the crowdfunding exemption for an "insignificant" violation of the conditions for the exemption.
Crowdfunding, Securities Act Release No. 947o, Exchange Act Release No. 70741, 78 Fed. Reg. at
66,562 (proposed Nov. 5, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 227-502).
128 Securities Act of 1933 § 3 (b)(i), 15 U.S.C. § 77 c(b)(i) (2012). Prior to the JOBS Act, the
statute was numbered 3 (b), 15 U.S.C.A. § 77c(b) (Supp. zozz), and did not contain the JOBS Act
language of section 3(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 7 7c(b)(2) (2012), discussed below.
129 JOBS Act § 401(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 7 7c(b)(i) (amending Securities Act of 1933 § 3 (b))
(authorizing the Commission to enact exemptions in situations in which registration "is not
necessary in the public interest and for the protection of investors"). Congress made explicit that
in enacting regulations "in the public interest" the Commission should "consider, in addition to
the protection of investors, whether the action will promote efficiency, competition and capital
formation."i5 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2012).
130 Regulation A, 17 C.F.R. § 230.251-.263 (2014).
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securities in an amount up to $5 million.131 The exemption is predicated on the
issuer's filing an offering statement with the Commission (roughly equivalent to
a registration statement) and providing each investor with an offering circular
(roughly equivalent to a prospectus).'32
The Commission in its Regulation A rules took pains to tailor the filing
and disclosure requirements in a way that balances investor protection with the
capital formation needs of small businesses. Thus, for example, the narrative
and financial disclosures were scaled back from the disclosure requirements
applicable for registration pursuant to a Form S-1.133 The Commission also
imposed no offeree or purchaser qualification requirements on Regulation
A offerings (e.g., no sophistication or accredited investor requirements) 3 4 or
restrictions on the resale of Regulation A securities. 3 s
At the time of the enactment of the JOBS Act, Regulation A was the
only generally available exemption from the registration requirements of the
1933 Act that permitted an issuer to engage in a broad, interstate search for
external capital.'3 6
Notwithstanding the apparent attractiveness of Regulation A for offerings
by small businesses, the Commission's carefully crafted regime turned out to
be an utter failure. In recent years, Regulation A has been essentially unused.137
The principal reason for the failure of Regulation A is the registration
requirements in state blue sky laws. A small issuer using Regulation A for a
wide offering is required, in addition to meeting the requirements of Regulation
A, to meet the registration requirements-either by registering the securities
with the state or qualifying for an exemption-in each state where its securities
are offered. The transaction costs generated by state registration rules simply
overwhelm any benefit small businesses may gain by using Regulation A."'
Title IV of the JOBS Act adds new Section 3(b)(2) to the 1933 Act.' 9
That section directs the Commission to enact new regulations providing an
131 17 C.F.R. § 23 0.251(b) ("The sum of all cash and other consideration to be received for
the securities ... shall not exceed s5,ooo,ooo, .. . less the aggregate offering price for all securities
sold within the twelve months before the start of and during the offering of securities in reliance
upon Regulation A.").
132 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(d)(i)(i).
133 For a description of the information disclosure requirements of a Regulation A offering,
see Campbell, A Moderate Capital, supra note 4, at 1o4-06.
134 Id. at 80.
135 See Rutheford B Campbell, Jr., Resales of Securities Under the Securities Act of i93, 52
WASH. & LEE L. REV. I333,1359-62 (1995)-
136 See Campbell,A Moderate Capital, supra note 4, at 92-99.
137 See supra Table II.
138 See Campbell, A Moderate Capital, supra note 4, at 106-12.
139 JOBS Act § 401(a)(2), s U.S.C. § 77c(b)(2) (202). Title IV of the Jobs Act, entitled
"Small Company Capital Formation," substantively changes nothing with regard to section 3 (b)
() of the 1933 Act.
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exemption from registration for offerings of up to $50 million.140 Delegation
of rule making authority to the Commission under this new Section 3(b)(2)
is broad. Perhaps most important among the few statutory limitations on the
Commission's delegated authority are, of course, the $50 million limit on a
Section 3(b)(2) offering,141 a statutory declaration that the securities are not
"restricted securities,"1 42 and a requirement that issuers relying on the Section
3(b)(2) exemption "file audited financial statements with the commission
annually. "143
The JOBS Act also deals with the important and politically sensitive matter
of the preemption of state authority over registration of securities offered under
the exemptions provided by Section 3(b). The JOBS Act amends NSMIA'" to
provide two bases for preemption of state registration authority over securities
sold in a Section 3(b)(2) offering. First, state authority is preempted if those
securities are "offered or sold on a national securities exchange."145 The other
basis for federal preemption of state authority over registration is if the securities
in a Section 3(b)(2) offering are "offered or sold to ... qualified purchaser[s], as
defined by the Commission. "146
The breadth of the legislative delegation of authority to the Commission in
Title IV of the JOBS Act offers the Commission an opportunity to construct
a new Section 3(b) regulatory exemption from registration that is efficient
for small issuers and sound as a matter of policy. To achieve these benefits,
however, the Commission, within the scope of its delegated authority, must
enact regulations that balance investor protection and capital formation. Most
important to a good outcome in that regard1 47 is a regulatory regime that
140 Id. § 40(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 7 7c(b)(2)(A).
141 Id.
142 Id § 40(a)(2), 15 U.S.C § 7 7c(b)(2)(C).
143 Id. § 401(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b)(2)CF).
144 Id § 4o(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77r.
145 Id § 40,(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77 r(b)(4(D)(i). My assumption is that "offered or sold on a
national securities exchange" means that the securities are listed for trading on the national
exchange. This, of course, will never be the case for small businesses, since their securities are not
traded on a national exchange.
146 Id. § 40(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)( 4 )(D)(ii). Prior to thejobs Act, the Commission had broad
authority to expand preemption to cover any offer and sale to "qualified purchasers, as defined by
the Commission."1s U.S.C.A. § 77 r(b)(3) (Supp. zoI).
147 As described above, the integration doctrine generates significant problems for offerings
under the proposed crowdfunding regulations. See supra notes 117-125 and accompanying text.
The proposed Regulation A rules, however, contain a direct and generally effective safe harbor for
Regulation A offerings. Proposed Rule 251, 17 C.F.R. § 23'o.251(c), provides Regulation A offerings
"will not be integrated with . . . [p]rior offers or sales of securities [or with] . .. [s]ubsequent offers
or sales that are ... [miade more than six months after the completion of the Regulation A offering
... [or made pursuant to] Regulation Crowdfunding." Proposed Rule Amendments for Small and
Additional Issues Exemptions Under Section 3 (b) of the Securities Act, Securities Act Release
No. 9497, Exchange Act Release No. 71,20, 79 Fed. Reg. 3926, 4ooo (proposed Jan. 23, 2014) (to be
codified at 17 C.FR. § 230.25i(c)). As the language indicates, the proposed Regulation A safe harbor
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conditions the Section 3(b) exemption on an efficient level of disclosure and
that eliminates state registration authority over Section 3(b) offerings.
The Commission has now offered its first iteration of the new Regulation A
regulations (proposed Regulation A rules). Unfortunately, the Commission's
proposed regulations fail to offer small businesses an efficient disclosure regime
or a sensible preemption option.
To facilitate the explanation of the proposed Regulation A rules and my
criticism of those regulations, it is helpful to offer a brief word about the
structure of the Commission's proposed Regulation A rules.
The new regulations dealing with offers and sales of securities in amounts
above the prior $5 million limit of Regulation A are integrated into the
preexisting regulatory structure of the Regulation A. Under the proposed
Regulation A rules, offerings of up to $5 million are referred to as "Tier 1
offerings" and offerings of up to $50 million are referred to as "Tier 2
offerings." 148 The requirements for a Tier 1 offering and a Tier 2 offering are
somewhat different. There is no lower threshold for Tier 2 offerings. Thus under
the proposed Regulation A rules, an issuer offering $5 million or less can qualify
for a Section 3(b) exemption by meeting the Tier 2 offering requirements.
It is also appropriate to reemphasize that the focus of this paper addresses the
extent to which the JOBS Act facilitates the legitimate capital formation needs
of small businesses. Because small business issuers typically have smaller capital
needs and because it is the smaller offerings that create the most difficulties
regarding high relative offering costs, my focus in the proposed Regulation A
rules is primarily on offerings of $5 million or less.
Consider first the disclosure requirements under the proposed Regulation A
rules for such a small offering. A small business issuer searching for $5 million
or less in external capital could qualify for an exemption under Section 3(b) by
meeting the disclosure requirements for a Tier 1 offering or a Tier 2 offering.The
advantage for the issuer in electing to meet the Tier 1 disclosure requirements
is that those disclosure requirements are less onerous (and thus less expensive)
than the disclosure requirements for a Tier 2 offering.
Even in a Tier 1 offering, however, small business issuers face significant and
expensive ex ante disclosure requirements in small offerings under the proposed
Regulation A rules. Proposed Form 1-A, which provides requirements both
for the offering statement and the offering circular, requires fourteen items of
narrative disclosures, plus financial disclosures, in the case of Tier 1 offerings. 149
While the Commission, to its credit, attempted in the proposed Regulation
A rules to reduce the amount of disclosures compared to a registered offering, 50
may also provide protection for crowdfunding offers. Id.
148 Id. at 3927.
149 Id. at 4008, 4o6-35 (to be codified at Form z-A, 17 C.FR. § 239.90).
15o For example, the description of the issuer's business required by Item 7 of the proposed
regulations governing the offering circular, compared to the disclosures required by Regulation
SK, reduces the number of past years that must be reflected in the Regulation A offering circular.
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the proposed narrative disclosures are still quite significant, especially as concerns
the relative offering costs for smaller offerings under the proposed rules. The
narrative disclosure requirements in the proposed Regulation A rules seem to
be a first cousin-perhaps a double first cousin-to the requirements reflected
in Regulation S-K.15' Indeed, the proposed Regulation A disclosures may
become even closer to the Regulation S-K requirements when one considers
that the small business issuer's actual ex ante Regulation A disclosures will
most likely be orchestrated by counsel who is experienced in securities matters
and familiar and comfortable with Regulation S-K. One would expect such
counsel to err on the side of more expansive disclosures, informed by her or his
experience in 1933 Act and 1934 Act disclosures.15 2
Also, it is worth noting that Item 9 of proposed Form 1-A requires the
small business issuer to provide a "Management's Discussion and Analysis of
Financial Condition and Results of Operations" (MD&A)."' This particular
section over the years has expanded to a major disclosure in documents filed
under the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act, for example in Form 10-Ks 5 4 of issuers
reporting under the 1934 Act.
With regard to ex ante financial disclosures required in the proposed
Form 1-A, small business issuers effecting a Tier 1 offering must provide
two years of financial statements compiled and presented in accordance with
GAAP.ss The statements must include balance sheets and statements of
Compare, e.g., Regulation S-K,17 C.F.R. § 229.Jo(a) (2014) (requiring five years of history regarding
development of the issuer's business), with Item 7(a)(1) of the proposed Form i-A, Proposed Rule
Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under Section 3(b) of the Securities
Act, Securities Act Release No. 9497, Exchange Act Release No. 71,120, 79 Fed. Reg. at 4022 (to
be codified at 17 C.ER. § 239.90) (requiring three years only); and compare, e.g., Regulation S-K,
17 C.F.R. § 229.zoa(c)(I)(xi) (requiring three years of research and development expenditures),
with Item 7(a)(i)(iii) of the proposed Form x-A, Proposed Rule Anrendments for Small and
Additional Issues Exemptions Under Section 3(b) of the Securities Act, Securities Act Release No.
9497, Exchange Act Release No. 71,120,79 Fed. Reg. at 4023 (to be codified at 17 C.ER. § 239.90)
(requiring two years only).
1sa Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. pt. 229 (2014).
152 Perhaps Item sa of the proposed Form i-A, "Compensation of Directors and Officers,"is
the best example of this. Proposed Rule Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions
Under Section 3(b) of the Securities Act, Securities Act Release No. 9497, Exchange Act Release
No. 71,120, 79 Fed. Reg. at 4028-29 (to be codified at Form i-A, V7 C.F.R. § 230.90). Although
the Item and its instructions amount to less than one page of Form i-A, it seems certain the
experienced counsel would rely heavily on Regulation S-K disclosures regarding compensation of
officer and directors, which regulations and instructions literally go on for tens of pages. See Item
402, 7 C.F.R. § 229.402 (204).
153 Proposed Rule Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under Section
3 (b) of the Securities Act, Securities Act Release No. 9497, Exchange Act Release No. 71,t2o, 79 Fed.
Reg. at 4024-26 (to be codified at Form a-A, 17 C.F.R. § 230.90).
154 Form so-K, 17 C.F.R. § 249-310 (2014).
155 Proposed Rule Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under Section
3 (b) of the Securities Act, Securities Act Release No. 9497, Exchange Act Release No. 71,I20, 79 Fed.
Reg. at 4033 (to be codified at Form a-A, Part F/S, 7 C.ER. § 230-90).
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income, cash flows, and stockholders equity."s' The financial statements do
not have to be audited, and the statements do not have to be compliant with
Regulation S-X.'5s
Tier 1 offerings generate no ex post periodic reporting requirements for
small business issuers using the proposed Regulation A rules. The only ex post
report required in a Tier 1 offering is a simple form, Form 1-Z, which provides
the Commission with information about the offer itself. It requires no updated
narrative or financial investment information. 158
Notwithstanding the modesty of the ex post reporting requirements, the
disclosure obligations as a whole for Tier 1 offerings generate a substantial level
of relative offering costs for a small business issuer seeking a small amount of
external capital. It is, however, difficult for me to find fault with the financial
disclosure requirements for a Tier 1 offering, except to offer the observation
that the balance between investor protection and capital formation for smaller
Tier 1 offerings (perhaps offerings of $2 million or less) might better have been
struck by retaining the one year balance sheet requirement that was in place
under the prior Regulation A regime. ss
The extent of narrative investment information required by the proposed
Regulation A rules in a Tier 1 offering, however, is more problematic. It is
difficult to conclude that the level of required disclosures, certainly in the
case of smaller Tier 1 offerings (again, perhaps offerings of $2 million or
less), amounts to a proper balance between investor protection and capital
formation. Relative transaction costs in the case of small Tier 1 offerings under
the proposed Regulation A rules may amount to an effective, practical bar to
the use of Regulation A for small offerings.
The disclosure requirements for a Tier 2 offering are more onerous than the
disclosure requirements for a Tier 1 offering. The principal ex ante disclosure
differences are that ina Tier 2 offering financial statements must be audited, 160
and compliant with a significant part of Regulation S-X.161
The big disclosure change imposed on Tier 2 offerings, however, is the
ex post periodic reporting requirement.
s6 Id. at 4035 (to be codified at Form i-A, Part F/S(b)(2) and (3), 7 C.F.R. § 230.90).
157 Id. at 4 o35- 36. The required financial statements for a Tier I offering under the proposed
Regulation A rules are similar to the preexisting Regulation A disclosure requirements, except the
prior rules required only a one year balance sheet. See Form i-A, Part F/S,1 7 C.F.R. § 239.90.
158 Proposed Rule Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under Section
3 (b) of the Securities Act, Securities Act Release No. 9 497, Exchange Act Release No. 7,120,79 Fed.
Reg. at 4061 n.13, 4062 (to be codified at Form r-Z,17 C.F.R. § 230.94).
159 See Form r-A, Part F/S, 17 C.F.R. § 239.90.
160 Proposed Rule Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under Section
3 (b) of the Securities Act, Securities Act Release No. 9497, Exchange Act Release No. 71,20,79 Fed.
Reg. at 4o35-36 (to be codified at Form i-A, Part F/S, 17 C.F.R. § 239.90).
161 Id. at 4036 (to be codified at Form i-A, Part F/S(c)(3),17 C.F.R. § 230.90).
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Issuers in Tier 2 offerings pick up obligations to file with the Commission
annual reports,162 semiannual reports,'1 3 and current reports,'" and this will
certainly amount to a significant obligation for any small business issuer in a
Tier 2 offering.'Ihe annual report, for example, must contain nearly the same
information as the original offering statement, except for information about the
original offering itself.'6 s'Ihe financial disclosures in the annual report require
annual, two-year, audited statements that are GAAP compliant and compliant
with Article 8 of Regulation S-X.'66 These obligations continue until the issuer
drops below 300 shareholders of record.6 7
Considering these additional burdens, it may seem unlikely that any small
offering of the type we are considering here-an offering of $5 million or
less-would be made as a Tier 2 offering, even though that is certainly
permissible. There is, however, a significant benefit for small business issuers
who move their small offerings to a Tier 2 offering regime.
Specifically, the Commission's proposed Regulation A rules effectively
preempt state registration authority over Tier 2 offerings,' 8 while there is no
effective preemption of state registration authority over Tier 1 offerings.
With regard to offerings of securities under the Tier 1 regime, the proposed
Regulation A rules preempt state registration authority over the offers of such
securities but not over the sales of those securities. This proposed preemption
162 Id. at 4004 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.257(b)(I)), 4041-46 (to be codified at Form
i-K, 7 C.F.R. § 239.91).
163 Id. at 4004 (to be codified at 7 C.ER. § 230.257(b)(3)), 4046-51 (to be codified at Form
i-SA, 17 C.F.R. § 239.92).
164 Id. at 4004 (to be codified at V7 C.ER. § 230.257(b)(4)), 4051-61 (to be codified at Form
i-U, 17 C.F.R. § 239-93).
165 Id. at 4041-46 (to be codified at Form i-K, 17 C.F.R. § 239-91).
166 Id. at 3952.
167 Id. at 4004 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.257(d)(2)). Although somewhat confusing, it
appears that the issuer in a Tier 2 offering would be subject to the periodic reporting requirements
for the year in which it offered securities in a Tier 2 offering, even if the issuer had less than 300
shareholders. Id. at 3964-65 (issuer with less than 300 shareholders may terminate "at any time after
completing reporting for the fiscal year in which the offering statement was qualified").
Allowing issuers to terminate periodic reporting in such cases may amount to a significant
mitigation of the relative transaction costs for a small business issuer relying on the Tier 2 offering
regime for its small offerings.
168 Section 18(a)(i)(A) of the Securities Act of I933 preempts state authority over registration
with regard to the offer or sale of a "covered security." § i8(a)(i)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 7 7r(a)(i)(A) (2012).
Section x8(b)(3) of the Securities Act of 1933 includes a security offered or sold to "qualified
purchasers, as defined by the Commission by rule" in the definition of a "covered security" Id. §
18(b)(3),15 U.S.C. § 77 r(b)(3).
Proposed Regulation A Rule 256 states: "For purposes of Section 18(b)( 3) of the Securities
Act [i U.S.C. 7 7r(b)( 3)], a'qualified purchaser'ofa security offered or sold pursuant to Regulation
A means any offeree of such security and, in a Tier 2 offering, any purchaser of such security."
Proposed Rule Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under Section 3 (b) of
the Securities Act, Securities Act Release No. 9497, Exchange Act Release No. 71420,79 Fed. Reg.
at 4003 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.256) (alteration in original).
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rule is both curious and unfortunate, and it is ineffective to protect small business
issuers from the pernicious impact that state authority over registration has on
small business capital formation. Indeed, the preemption rule in its present
form most likely amounts to the death knell for Tier 1 offerings.
To understand the problems of a small business issuer attempting to meet
the state registration requirements in a Tier 1 offering, imagine a situation
in which a small business issuer proposes to offer its securities broadly in all
fifty states. Assume that the issuer gets indications of interest from potential
investors in ten states and thus proposes to sell its securities under the proposed
Regulation A rules in a Tier 1 offering in all ten of those states. The issuer
still has to meet the registration requirements respecting sales in each of those
states, and there is what may be a significant complication regarding the issuer's
meeting the state registration requirements regarding those sales.
Assume-as quite likely may be the case-that the small business issuer
proposes to rely in each of those states on the particular state's version of its
limited offering exemption. The conditions for some of those state exemptions
will almost certainly involve strict limitations on offers by the issuer. Consider
as an example the requirements for a small offering exemption under the
Uniform Securities Act.169 That exemption is predicated on the issuer's meeting
three conditions: (1) no more than ten offers; (2) a reasonable belief that "all
the buyers . . . are purchasing for investment"; and (3) no commission paid to
intermediaries in connection with the offering.170
What is unclear, however, is the impact of the federal preemption on the
state's requirements regarding the offer. Does the preemption merely mean that
the original broad solicitation by the small business issuer enjoys the benefit
of preemption with regard to the broad offer, leaving the exemption for the
sale dependent on the issuer's meeting, for example, all the three conditions
described above, including the ten offer limit? Or, does the preemption change
the conditions for a sale pursuant to the state small offering exemption, with
the result that a small business issuer meets the requirements for an exempt
sale under state's small offering exemption if the issuer meets only the other
two conditions described above-(2) buyers purchasing for investment and
(3) no commissions paid?
This latter interpretation-that the state exemption can now be met merely
by purchasing for investment and no commissions-seems problematic.
It essentially changes the state small offering exemption to permit an unlimited
number of sales of unregistered securities, an outcome that arguably is
inconsistent with the policy bases for the legislative decision to exempt such
sales.
169 UNIF. SEc. ACT § 4 02(b)(9 ), 7C U.L.A. 847 (1956).
170 Id. The small offering exemption for the District of Columbia limits the exemption to
"an offer ... to not more than 25 persons." D.C. CODE § 3 I- 56o 4 .o2(12)(A) (Lexis NexiS 2012). The
small offering exemption in Colorado limits offers to "not more than twenty persons." COLO. REV.
STAT. § II- 51-308(j) (203).
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Alternatively, a court could declare the exemption entirely
nullified-and thus unavailable-as a result of the federal preemption over
the offer. By eliminating the principal condition for the exemption, the entire
exemption, a court might find, simply fails.
The expense ofattempting to qualify the sale under multiple state exemptions,
especially when complicated by uncertainty regarding the requirements of the
exemptions after preemption of state authority over offers, would seem to make
the expenses and risks too high to be useful to small business issuers in search
of a relatively small amount of external capital.
'The likely outcome here, if the Commission holds to its proposed
preemption rules, is that Regulation A will provide an attractive alternative
for larger, non-public companies in search of a sizeable amount of external
capital. Unfortunately, it is also nearly certain that the preemption regime of
the proposed Regulation rule will ensure that Regulation A will continue to
be unused by small business issuers in search of relatively small amounts of
capital."'
We continue to return to the same issues. In order for exemptions to work
for small business issuers, relative offering costs-disclosure costs, in the case of
Title IV of the JOBS Act-must be at an efficient level, and state registration
requirements have to be eliminated by preemption. The Commission
significantly failed in its proposed Regulation A rules to meet those conditions.
This is all fixable by a revision of the Commission's proposed Regulation A
rules, but the question is the will of the Commission to fix the problem,
especially the problem of state authority over registration. In an article I wrote
shortly after the JOBS Act was passed, I predicted, pessimistically, that the
Commission would not be willing to exercise fully its delegated authority to
preempt state authority over offerings by small business issuers under the revised
Regulation A.172 The proposed Regulation A rules suggest that, unfortunately,
I was substantially correct.
One cannot but notice the irony that Title IV of the JOBS Act is entitled
"Small Company Capital Formation."
171 Small business issuers may respond in one of two ways to this problem. First, of course,
the small business issuer may abandon entirely the Regulation A exemption, either by foregoing
capital formation altogether or by utilizing a less desirable path to meeting the registration
requirements of the 1933 Act.
Second, the small business issuer may move to a Tier 2 offering under Regulation A, even
for its small offerings (i.e., offerings within the Tier i offering range of s5 million or less). While
this would increase both the ex ante and ex post offering expenses, it would allow the small business
issuer to enjoy the benefits of preemption. Such a response can be observed in Regulation D
offerings, where approximately 8o% of small offerings that are within the range covered by Rule
504 (s million or less) are made under the more onerous provisions of Rule 5o6. The reason for this
is that offerings under Rule 506 preempt state authority over the registration. See Campbell, The
Wreck ofRegulation D, supra note 26, at 926-33.
172 Campbell, Failure to Resuscitate, supra note 27, at 317
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CONCLUSION
An efficient access to external capital by businesses is essential to a market
economy. Small businesses, which amount to a vital component of our market
economy, face not only structural and economic disadvantages but also legal
obstacles in their search for essential external capital.
The JOBS Act, at least apparently, was aimed at reducing inefficient legal
rules governing small businesses' access to capital. While the Act itself is
something of a mess, it did offer the Commission an opportunity to construct
regulatory regimes to ameliorate the problems of small businesses in regard to
capital formation. The Commission, however, has failed to take fill advantage
of this opportunity.
The JOBS Act change in Rule 506 offerings to permit a broad solicitation
for investors will help small businesses. The exemption from registration,
however, is limited to sales to accredited investors, and that by definition is a
limited capital market for small businesses.
The first iteration of the Commission's crowdfunding regulations and its
new Regulation A rules need substantial work in a second iteration. Without
significant changes, the crowdfunding will be less available for small business
issuers than efficiency would require, and the new Regulation A rules may be
essentially unavailable for small businesses.
As stated above, these problems regarding the crowdfunding regulations
and the proposed Regulation A rules are fixable, if the Commission has the will.
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